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PUT THE TOWN ON NOTICE: SCHOOL DISTRICT
LIABILITY AND LGBT BULLYING NOTIFICATION LAWS
Yariv Pierce*
Congress could mitigate the problem of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) student bullying by requiring that teachers and school officials report all
bullying incidents to their school district administrators. Many school districts are
not aware of the prevalence of LGBT bullying and the extent to which each school
protects, orfails to protect, its LGBT students compared to other harassed students.
LGBT students often encounter difficulty demonstrating that their school district
has a policy or custom of deliberate indifference toward their equal treatment when
a school does not equally protect an LGBT student from peer-to-peer bullying be-
cause of the student's LGBT status. This Note proposes a federal notification law
requiring teachers and school officials to report incidents of bullying to school dis-
trict administrators. This requirement would enable LGBT students and their al-
lies to pressure school districts for equal protection and to litigate if unequal
treatment persists. A notification law would provide a basis for such action because
it would create direct evidence that the school district was aware of the problem-an
essential element in an equal protection cause of action.
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School bullying may be a common part of growing up, but les-
bian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) students experience
bullying at a disproportionately higher rate than their non-LGBT
peers.1 Unfortunately, many school officials turn a blind eye to
certain victims of harassment.2 Current law is limited in its ability to
provide recourse for these students. School administrators and
1. Compare SUSAN M. SWEARER, RISK FACrORS FOR AND OUTCOMES OF BULLYING AND VIC-
TIMIZATION 4 (2011), available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1131&context=edpsychpapers ("Research conducted with 7,261 students (ages 13 to 21) in
2009 found that 84.6% of LGBT students reported being verbally harassed, 40.1% reported
being physically harassed and 18.8% reported being physically assaulted at school in the past
year because of their sexual orientation[.]"), with NATIONAL SCHOOLt SAFETY CENTER, REVIEW
OF SCHOOL SAFETY RESEARCH 2 (2005), available at http://www.schoolsafety.us/media-re-
sources/school-crime-and-violence-statistics ("In 2005, 28 percent of students 12 to 18 years
old reported being bullied at school during the six months prior to the survey.").
2. Cf Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 460-61 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the stu-
dent provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the school district violated the stu-
dent's right to equal protection because the school district treated the LGBT student
differently from other bullied students).
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teachers are not automatically liable for harassment or violence be-
tween students 3 and many government employees who are respon-
sible for the safety of the student body have qualified immunity,
which shields them from liability for their action or inaction in re-
sponse to students' abuse at the hands of their peers. 4 Moreover, a
school district administration may not become aware of LGBT stu-
dent bullying or have the opportunity to alleviate the problem with-
out a required process for notifying oversight authorities.
5
LGBT-related bullying may affect heterosexual students as well.
In Schroeder v. Maumee Board of Education, a student was perceived as
gay because he defended his gay brother.6 This student suffered
three years of physical assault and verbal abuse.7 The court held
that the school board was not liable because no one had put the
school board members or the superintendent on notice of the
abuse, and therefore the school district had not been given the op-
portunity to address the harassment." This lack of knowledge is a
problem for administrators who want to facilitate student safety and
for students' attorneys who need to demonstrate in litigation that
school officials were deliberately indifferent to LGBT students'
welfare.9 Congress should resolve this problem by establishing
mechanisms to ensure that a school's highest authorities are aware
of discrimination in their schools.
This Note proposes that Congress adopt a bullying notification
law to help establish school district liability for equal protection vio-
lations.' 0 The law would require teachers and school administrators
3. Cf DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 189-90 (1989)
(holding that the State has no affirmative legal duty to protect students from violence).
4. Cf Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (establishing that a government
official may receive qualified immunity for an objectively reasonable action, even if that ac-
tion is allegedly unlawful). Teachers and school administrators are government employees.
See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75-76, 80 (1979) (teachers); Stoneking v. Bradford
Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 730 (3d Cir. 1989) (school supervisors).
5. Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1118 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
(holding that a cognizable claim did not exist because plaintiff did not allege that defendants
were aware of specific incidents of harassment); Martin v. Swartz Creek Cmty. Sch., 419 F.
Supp. 2d 967, 975 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (concluding that a jury could infer the school district's
deliberate indifference because the school received monthly notifications of continued har-
assment); Drews v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 393, No. CV04-388-N-EJL, 2006 WL 851118, at *4, *9
(N.D. Idaho Mar. 29, 2006) (stating that school officials had no Title IX liability, in part,
because they lacked knowledge of the harassment); Schroeder ex rel. Schroeder v. Maumee
Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 2d 871, 875-76 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (rejecting school board liability
for harassment because the school board administrators were not aware of the abuse).
6. 296 F. Supp. 2d at 870-71.
7. See id.
8. Id. at 875-76 (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment).
9. See id.
10. Although state legislatures may also adopt bullying notification laws, and some have
done so, this Note focuses on a proposed federal law requiring school district notification.
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to report incidents of peer-to-peer bullying to their school district
or town council. The purpose of such a bullying notification law is
twofold. First, the reporting requirement would compel local gov-
ernments to increase their awareness and oversight of bullying in
their schools. Second, if local governments do not take sufficient
remedial action, a record of bullying reports may make it easier for
students to demonstrate that the town has a policy or custom of
allowing bullying to occur. If such a policy or custom treats student
bullying differently based on the victim's membership in a particu-
lar class of people, then those students may raise a § 198311 claim
for the violation of their equal protection right.12
The federal judiciary has decided ten cases clarifying the summary
judgment standard for school district liability in § 1983 equal pro-
tection claims for failure to protect students from LGBT bullying. 3
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). For the origins and role of § 1983 in constitutional tort
litigation, see infra Part IIA.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
13. Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2003)
(denying school district administrators' summary judgment motion because the LGBT and
LGBT-perceived students "presented sufficient evidence to raise an inference of deliberate
indifference"); Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 457, 460-61 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the student provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the school district violated the
student's right to equal protection because the school district treated the LGBT student dif-
ferently from other bullied students); Brown v. Ogletree, No. 11-CV-1491, 2012 WL 591190,
at *12 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2012) (holding that a mother did not plead sufficient facts to
demonstrate that the school district deprived her son of equal protection after her son com-
mitted suicide following extensive LGBT bullying at school); Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified
Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1116-17 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing the equal protection
claim against a superintendent and allowing the equal protection claim against a principal
based on the extent of facts plausibly demonstrating discrimination against a member of an
identifiable class); Seiwert v. Spencer-Owen Cmty. Sch. Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 942, 953-54
(S.D. Ind. 2007) (denying summary judgment to a school district in an equal protection
claim because of evidence that the school district "departed from its established practices in
dealing with" harassment based on a student's sexual orientation); Martin v. Swartz Creek
Cmty. Sch., 419 F. Supp. 2d 967, 975 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (granting summary judgment to a
school district in LGBT student's equal protection claim because plaintiff failed to meet his
burden of demonstrating treatment different from similarly situated individuals); Drews v.
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 393, No. CV04-388-N-EJL, 2006 WL 851118, at *4, *8 (N.D. Idaho Mar.
29, 2006) (holding that a school district was not liable for equal protection violation when
harassment involved picture of a female student kissing another female because the student
was not a lesbian, her peers were aware that she was not a lesbian, and there was no evidence
that school district perceived her to be a lesbian); Shaposhinkov v. Pacifica Sch. Dist., No. C
04-01288 SI, 2006 WL 931731, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2006) (granting the school district's
summary judgment motion, disregarding the equal protection claim, and dismissing the Title
IX peer-to-peer harassment claim because the student continued to excel academically and
there were only "minor" instances of physical violence); Moore v. Marion Cmty. Sch. Bd. of
Educ., No. 1:04-CV-483, 2006 WL 2051687, at *9 (N.D. Ind. Jul. 19, 2006) (concluding that
Title IX precluded a student's § 1983 equal protection claim) (holding later abrogated by
the Supreme Court in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 258-59 (2009) (re-
jecting the argument that Title IX precludes a § 1983 equal protection action)); Schroeder ex
rel. Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 2d 869, 871, 875-76 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
FALL 2012] Put the Town on Notice
The summary judgment standard 14 is an important hurdle for
LGBT bullying plaintiffs who must rebut the common defense that
school districts were not aware of any discriminatory verbal or physi-
cal bullying. 1 Notification laws would help these students by ensur-
ing that school districts are made aware of bullying and by
providing records that corroborate students' claims that school au-
thorities were aware of the harassment. 16
To establish the types of harassment that require notification,
this Note provides a working definition of bullying and explains
how the courts have held school districts liable for certain types of
peer-to-peer harassment when the district administrators do not ad-
equately protect their students. Legislatures have defined bullying
in many ways. In this Note, bullying means any severe or pervasive
electronic, written, verbal, or physical act by one student toward an-
other student that is based on an actual or perceived trait of the
victim, and causes the victim to reasonably fear for her person,
property, or mental health. 17 This definition is an amalgamation of
several state statutes and pending federal bills that address LGBT
bullying.18
(dismissing an equal protection claim against a school board because no member of the
school board or the superintendent was informed that a student was repeatedly called a
"fag," had his head hit into a urinal, and experienced other harassment).
14. Litigants file summaryjudgment motions to determine whether there is enough evi-
dence for the court to decide the case as a matter of law or whether the parties should
continue to present facts. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 56(a).
15. Cf Gant ex rel. Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1999)
(granting motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to produce evidence
that the defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to the student's harassment).
16. See Fores, 324 F.3d at 1135 (allowing the case to proceed because the plaintiffs
presented sufficient evidence to raise an inference of deliberate indifference); see alsoKristin
Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should Schools and Public Housing
Authorities Be Notified, 79 N.Y.U. L. R, v. 520, 610-11 (2004) (discussing the value of student
criminal record notification laws for campus safety).
17. This definition is based on an Iowa statute, which is similar to the federal bill and
other state statutes quoted infra note 18. See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.28 (2011) (defining
bullying as "any electronic, written, verbal, or physical act or conduct toward a student which
is based on any actual or perceived trait or characteristic of the student and which creates an
objectively hostile school environment that meets one or more of the following conditions,"
including an act that "places the student in reasonable fear of harm to the student's person
or property" or has a "substantially detrimental effect on the student's physical or mental
health").
18. See, e.g., Student Non-Discrimination Act of 2011, S. 555, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011)
(defining harassment as "conduct that is sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive to limit a
student's ability to participate in or benefit from a program or activity of a public
school . . . [,] to create a hostile or abusive educational environment ... [, and] including
acts of verbal, nonverbal, or physical aggression, intimidation, or hostility"); Mn. CODE ANN.,
EDUC. § 7-424.1 (West 2008) (defining bullying as actions that create a "hostile educational
environment" that interferes with "a student's physical or psychological well-being"); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West Supp. 2012) (including in its definition of bullying acts that
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This Note will demonstrate how a notification law requiring
teachers and school administrators to report LGBT bullying to the
school district can facilitate the use of existing law to improve
LGBT students' welfare. The value of such liability is based on the
normative assumption that LGBT student welfare is equally impor-
tant to other students' welfare.' 9 Notification laws are an effective
mechanism for influencing behavior and can facilitate LGBT stu-
dents' equal treatment and equal rights.20
Part I of this Note demonstrates the problem of peer-to-peer bul-
lying of LGBT students and students who are perceived to be
LGBT. Part II describes the current legal framework within which
attorneys must work to bring suit against school districts for equal
protection violations. Part III explains why LGBT students encoun-
ter particular difficulty when suing school districts for failing to
treat them equally with other bullied students. Part IV argues for a
federal legislative reform that would ensure that school districts are
made aware of any LGBT bullying that occurs in their schools. By
requiring documentation of peer-to-peer bullying, the proposed
bullying notification law would enable students and their advocates
to prove that a school district has a practice of violating LGBT stu-
dents' right to equal protection.
I. LGBT STUDENT BULLYING: PROBLEMS AT SCHOOL
AND ATTEMPTS AT REDRESS
Bullying is a serious problem for LGBT youth. This section
presents statistics on LGBT student harassment and describes the
problematic relationships between some LGBT youth and their
teachers and administrators. It then outlines the common features
place "a student in reasonable fear of physical or emotional harm to his person or damages
to his property"); OR. REv. STAT. § 339.351 (2011) (defining bullying as actions that create a
"hostile educational environment" that interferes with "a student's physical or psychological
well-being"); WASH. REv. CODE § 28A.300.285 (2010) (defining bullying as "any intentional,
electronic, written, verbal or physical act" when the act "physically harms," "substantially in-
terfere[s] with a student's education," or is "so severe, persistent or pervasive that it creates
an intimidating or threatening educational environment").
19. See Sanford Levinson, What Do Lawyers Know (And What Do They Do with Their Knowl-
edge)? Comments on Schauer and Moore, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 441, 452 (1985) ("1 have no argu-
ments for the objectivity of moral judgments except moral arguments, no argument for the
objectivity of interpretivejudgments except interpretive arguments.") (quoting Ronald Dwor-
kin); Karl N. Llewellyn, Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 CoLUM. L. REv. 441, 448
(1930) ("The measure of a 'rule,' the measure of a right, becomes what can be done about
the situation.").
20. Cf J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws
Affect Criminal Behavior?, 54J,L. & ECON. 161, 168 (2011) (discussing the effect of notification
laws on human behavior in the sex offender registry context).
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of bullying legislation in the twelve states that have applied such
laws to LGBT students. Lastly, it describes the efforts of the current
presidential administration to ameliorate the problem of LGBT
bullying, and the two LGBT bullying bills introduced by members
of Congress.
A. The Problem of LGBT Student Bullying
LGBT youth frequently encounter a discouraging and often dan-
gerous school environment without sufficient legal protection. Ac-
cording to a 2009 study, 84.6 percent of LGBT students have been
verbally harassed, 40.1 percent have been physically harassed, and
18.8 percent have been physically assaulted because of their LGBT
status. 21 These students are uniquely vulnerable to harassment be-
cause nonconformity with heterosexual norms is a cause of student
bullying.22 School bullies commonly focus on LGBT and LGBT-per-
ceived students because bullies target norm violators who appear
too feminine or too masculine.
23
The traumatic bullying experienced by many LGBT youth has
debilitating psychological ramifications. Between 2006 and 2008, 20
percent of lesbian and gay youth reported that they had attempted
suicide, 24 while only 4 percent of heterosexual youth reported hav-
ing done the same.25 Bullying may also lead to increasingly violent
actions by the bully if schools do not address harassment before
such behavior becomes severe or pervasive.
26
Different aspects of harassment, including frequency and sever-
ity, delineate the line between bullying and mere teasing.27 While
21, JOSEPH G, KoscIw Er AL., THE 2009 NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE SuRVEY: THE EXPER-
IENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN OUR NATION'S SCHOOLS, GAY,
LESBIAN AND STRAiCWFT EDUCATION NETWORK 26-27 (2010), available at http://www.glsen.org/
binary-data/GLSENATrACHMENTS/file/000/001 / 1675-2.pdf.
22. See Michael J. Higdon, To Lynch a Child: Bullying and Gender Nonconformity in our Na-
tion's Schools, 86 IND. L.J. 827, 836 (2011).
23. See id. at 842-43; see also Marc R. Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf" Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale and the Politics of American Masculinity, 12 L. & SEXUALniw 271, 276 (2003)
(stating that the Boy Scouts of America's "gay exclusion litigation... [made it] easier for the
average citizen to notice how masculinity is constructed around the exclusion of sissies and
the heteronorming of role models").
24. Mark L. Hatzenbuehler, The Social Environment and Suicide Attempts in Lesbian, Gay,
and Bisexual Youth, 127 PEDIATICS 896, 899 (2011).
25. Id.
26. Id.; see also Daniel O'Donnell, LGBT New York Legislation, 4 ALB. GoV'T L. REv. 625,
639 (2011).
27. Higdon, supra note 22, at 834-35.
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this Note defines bullying as any severe or pervasive electronic, writ-
ten, verbal, or physical act by one student toward another student
based on an actual or perceived trait that causes the student to rea-
sonably fear for his or her person, property or mental health,28
states use different terms to target similar abuse. For example,
South Carolina prohibits bullying that causes a "substantial disrup-
tion,"29 while North Carolina prohibits bullying that causes a "hos-
tile environment. '" 30 This Note uses the terms "severe" and
"pervasive" because the Supreme Court has held that a school dis-
trict can be liable for damages for peer-to-peer harassment when
the school district acts with "deliberate indifference" to acts that are
"severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive."',
LGBT students' peers are not solely responsible for peer-to-peer
bullying. In areas where LGBT bullying is most pervasive, local
school officials may be unresponsive because of the perception that
it is futile to penalize LGBT harassment or the belief that LGBT
students deserve abuse.32 The existence of state-funded education
programs that demean gay and lesbian students confirms that some
adults facilitate peer-to-peer LGBT discrimination.33 Administrators
have commented that gay-related slurs are so frequent that such
harassment is simply a part of childhood culture. 34 Some teachers
perceive LGBT bullying as a normal part of childhood that does not
warrant a response.3 5 Moreover, teachers and guidance counselors
themselves may harbor prejudice toward taunted students. 36 Gay
and lesbian students may also be reluctant to report being bullied
28. This definition is based on an Iowa statute, IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.28 (2011), which
is representative of other states' statutes.
29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-120(1)(b) (Supp. 2011) (defining substantial disruption as
the benchmark of bullying).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C-407.15(a) (2) (West 2011) (defining a hostile environ-
ment as the benchmark of bullying).
31. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 631 (1999).
32. See Higdon, supra note 22, at 836, 844 (citing ELIZABETHJ. MEYER, GENDER, BULLYING,
AND HARASSMENT: STRATEGIES TO END SEXISM AND HOMOPHOBIA IN ScHooLs 23 (2009)); see
also Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 452 (7th Cir. 1996) (detailing the futility of one stu-
dent's decision to report repeated incidents of bullying to school officials).
33. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and
the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1327, 1359-60 (2000) (discussing
public school education programs that advocated against acceptance of the LGBT
community).
34. See Higdon, supra note 22, at 844.
35. See id.
36. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sticky Intuitions and the Future of Sexual Orientation Dis-
crimination, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1375, 138-91 (2010) (discussing common societal intuitions
and prejudices against LGBT individuals); Nicolyn Harris & Maurice R. Dyson, Safe Rules or
Gays'Schools? The Dilemma of Sexual Orientation Segregation in Public Education, 7 U. PA.J. CONST.
L. 183, 187-88 (2004).
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for fear that reporting would be an admission that they are LGBT
individuals 7 Such reluctance is unique to members of the LGBT
community because reporting bullying based on discernible charac-
teristics such as race, class, religion, physical appearance, and social
circle generally does not include the additional fear of confirming
oneself as a member of that group.38 Even if a student does not
report being bullied, teachers may witness bullying in classrooms,
hallways, and on school grounds that they can and should report.
3 9
Policymakers and academics have responded to the problem with
a wide range of solutions and suggestions. Some have chosen to
criminalize student bullying and administrators' failure to stop
peer-to-peer bullying.40 Others, preferring a soft power, extralegal
response, have chosen to facilitate education that teaches students
to stand up for each other.41 There are also statutes that fall some-
where in the middle of the spectrum. 42 These laws try to improve
the enforcement mechanisms for peer-to-peer bullying provisions
that already exist. 43 A federal bullying notification law would im-
prove the effectiveness of existing state bullying statutes.
37. See R. Kent Piacenti, Toward a Meaningful Response to the Problem of Anti-Gay Bullying in
American Public Schools, 19 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 58, 100 (2011).
38. But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out". Religion, Homosexual-
ity, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2415 (1997)
(discussing the similarity between religious and sexual orientation identity).
39. Julie Sacks & Robert S. Salem, Victimrs Without Legal Remedies: Why Kids Need Schools to
Develop Comprehensive Anti-Bullying Policies, 72 ALB. L. REv. 147, 159 (2009) (describing a situa-
tion where students and teachers who witnessed instances of bullying did not intervene).
40. Susan W. Brenner & Megan Rehberg, "Kiddie Crime"? The Utility of Criminal Law in
Controlling Cyberbullying, 8 FIRsT AMEND. L. REv, 1, 79-82 (2009); Scott Farbish, Note, Sending
the Principal to the Warden's Office: Holding School Officials Criminally Liable for Failing to Report
Cyberbullying, 18 CARDOZOJ.L. & GENDER 109, 127 (2010).
41. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented: Antigay Bullying in Schools, 84 TEMP. L. REv. 385,
438 (2012).
42. Lisa C. Connolly, Anti-Gay Bullying in Schools-Are Anti-Bullying Statutes the Solution?,
87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 248, 259 (2012).
43, See id. at 260.
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B. Attempts at Redress: State Governments
Bullying laws exist in forty-nine states, 4 4 though only twelve states
prohibit bullying based on LGBT status. 45 These twelve states re-
present a slow increase in legislative protections for LGBT youth. 46
These statutes provide varying levels of protection, which range
from requirements that local towns develop their own policies47 to
requirements that towns have a method of reporting incidents to
school officials who would collect and maintain bullying data.4
There appears to be three general levels of state protection. Illinois,
New Mexico, New York, and Vermont prohibit LGBT bullying with-
out designating specific policies and remedies. 49 North Carolina
and Washington designate a school official who is responsible for
receiving reports of bullying bias.50 California, Iowa, Maryland, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, and Oregon have enacted the most robust
statutes, which include data collection or direct reporting
requirements. 51
Three states are representative of the three levels of legislative
reform. The Illinois statute merely requires towns to develop their
own policies;52 North Carolina proactively requires its teachers to
44. Montana does not have a bullying law but the other states provide varying levels of
bullying protections. See, e.g., SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, STATE CYBERBULLYING
LAws: A BRIEF REVIEW OF STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS AND POLICIES (2012), available at http://
www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying-andCyberbullyingLaws.pdf; Policies & Laws, STOPBULLING
.cov, www.stopbullying.gov/laws (last visited Aug. 14, 2012); see also BULL POUCE USA,
http://www.bullypolice.org/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2012).
45. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 234.1 (West Supp. 2012); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/27-
23.7 (West Supp. 2012); IOwA CODE ANN. § 280.28 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424.1
(West 2008); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:2 (2008 & Supp. 2011); Nj. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-
14 (West Supp. 2012); NY Enuc. LAw §§ 11-12 (McKinney Supp. 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-407.15 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11, 165
(2004 & Supp. 2011); WASH. REV. CODE. § 28A.300.285 (2010); N.M. CODE R. §§ 6.12.7.1-8
(2006); see a/soJason A. Wallace, Bullycide in American Schools: Forging a Comprehensive Legislative
Solution, 86 IND. L.J. 735, 751 (2011) (collecting certain statutes).
46. See Jeffrey I. Bedell, Personal Liability of School Officials Under § 1983 Who Ignore Peer
Harassment of Gay Students, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 839 (noting that six states and the District
of Columbia already had such legislation by 2003).
47. N.M. CODE R. §§ 6.12.7.1-8 (2006).
48. IowA CODE ANN. § 280.28 (2011).
49. See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/27-23.7 (West Supp. 2012); N.Y. EDuc. LAw
§§ 11-12 (McKinney Supp. 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11, 165 (2004 & Supp. 2011);
N.M. CODE R. §§ 6.12.7.1-8 (2006).
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.15(d) (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.300.285 (2010).
51. CAl. EDUC. CODE § 234.1 (West Supp. 2012); IowA CODE ANN. § 280.28 (2011); MD.
CODE ANN., EDUC., § 7-424.1 (West 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:4 (2008 & Supp.
2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15(6) (West Supp. 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356 (2011).
52. In Illinois, the statute protects students from bullying based on their LGBT status,
but the protection is a top-down directive limited to requiring towns to develop their own
approach to LGBT bullying prevention. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/27-23.7 (West Supp.
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inform the principal about bullying;53 New Hampshire specifies
many protections but leaves its students at a loss if they want to
enforce violations of the bullying law.54 Like the New Hampshire
statute, the New Jersey bullying law has many protective measures
but misses a key step in providing school district liability for the
benefit of LGBT litigants.55 In New Jersey, the principal must inves-
tigate certain bullying incidents and report the investigation results
to the superintendent, who in turn reports the findings to the
Board of Education. There is no statutory requirement, however,
that this information be disseminated to the public for potential
litigants to recognize when a discriminatory custom exists and rely
on that information for litigation.
56
On July 1, 2012, Oregon's new bullying law was enacted, follow-
ing the NewJersey statute in compelling school employees to report
2012). The law provides limited protection because it only requires that each school district
write an anti-bullying policy to be updated every two years. Id. There is no requirement that
people report incidents to the school district administrators. Id. Lastly, the only oversight
mechanism is a vague requirement that the State Board of Education must monitor the
school district's implementation of the policies. Id.
53. The North Carolina LGBT bullying statute incorporates a bottom-up approach, in
that it requires teachers to report incidents to another school official. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-407.15(d) (2011). However, there is no requirement that the governing municipal
board receive any notification. The statute declares: "A school employee who has witnessed
or has reliable information that a student or school employee has been subject to any act of
bullying or harassing behavior shall report the incident to the appropriate school official." -d.
A student may benefit from a notification to an appropriate school official, but any such
official could have the same immunity defenses as teachers to a claim for liability, such that
notification would not enhance the student's legal recourses.
54. New Hampshire has implemented a more progressive bullying law. N.H. REv. STAr.
ANN. § 193-F:1-5 (2008 & Supp. 2011). The New Hampshire statute includes a top-down di-
rective to local officials to develop a bullying policy and specifies how bullying should be
defined. Id. § 193-F:4. The law also requires that parents be notified of the incident within 48
hours, unless a waiver is required in the best interest of one of the students. Id. §§ 193-
F:4(h)-(i). The statute also includes a bottom-up requirement that a principal report all
relevant incidents to a superintendent or a superintendent's designee. Id. § 193-F:4(l). Un-
like similar state laws, the law requires the school district to submit an annual report to the
Department of Education on its incidents of bullying. Id. § 193-F:6.
Although the New Hampshire law appears to be a victory for supporters of LGBT bullying
legislation, the legislature significantly reduced the law's impact by limiting its enforcement
mechanisms. First, the legislation included a provision reiterating the immunity of school
administrators and the school district. Id. § 193-F:7. Second, in case the immunity provision
does not cover an unforeseen lawsuit, an additional provision establishes that nothing in the
legislation was intended to create a private right of action to enforce the legislation. Id. § 193-
F:9. The lack of enforcement mechanisms is ubiquitous across states' bullying legislation and
is consistent with current legal precedent concerning the extent to which municipalities can
be held liable for their impotence or indifference when confronted with the challenges faced
by their LGBT youth. See Wallace, supra note 45, at 750-51.
55. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:37-15(6)(b) -(c) (West Supp. 2012).
56. See id.
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acts of LGBT bullying to a designated person at each school. The
Oregon law also includes the school district in the process of deter-
mining who receives the reports of harassment 58 and requires that a
school district official be responsible for implementing antidis-
crimination policies. 59 This law, while a good step forward, is not
wholly sufficient for establishing school district awareness and liabil-
ity because the statute allows the school district to designate a non-
school district official to receive the reports of bullying.60 The New
Jersey and Oregon statutes should serve as initial, though imper-
fect, models for a federal notification requirement.
C. Attempts at Redress: Federal Government
The importance of addressing the LGBT bullying problem at the
local level is heightened by the fact that federal law has yet to pro-
tect students from harassment based on their LGBT status. 61 In Sep-
tember 2011, the United States Commission on Civil Rights
published a report that found that "federal civil rights laws do not
protect students from peer-to-peer harassment that is solely on the
basis of sexual orientation.."62 Moreover, the Department of Educa-
tion (DOE) does not keep records of harassment based on LGBT
status, although it does keep records for harassment based on gen-
der, race, religion, and disability complaints from individuals who
voluntarily file a discrimination complaint with the DOE Office for
Civil Rights. 63 Recently, however, the Executive Branch began to
use its authority under Title IX to protect LGBT students, and
members of Congress have proposed bills that, if passed, would pro-
vide protection for LGBT students.
Although Title IX could be used to combat some LGBT bullying,
there remains a practical gap between the gender discrimination
targeted by Title IX and the range of discrimination affecting the
LGBT community. Title IX gives the Executive authority to combat
57. S.B. 240, 76th Leg. Assembly (Or. 2011) (to be codified at OR. REv. STAT. § 339.356);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15 (West Supp. 2012).
58. S.B. 240, 76th Leg. Assembly (Or. 2011) (to be codified at OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 339.356(2) (f) (A)-(B), (2)(g)).
59. Id. (to be codified at § 339.356(2)(n)).
60. Id. (to be codified at § 339.362(2) (a)).
61. See UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PEER-TO-PEER VIOLENCE AND BULLY-
ING: EXAMINING THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 88 (2011), available at www.usccr.gov/pubs/2011
statutory.pdf.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 33-35; see also Office of Civil Rights, How to File a Discrimination Complaint with
the Office for Civil Rights, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
ocr/docs/howto.html (last visited May 27, 2012).
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gender-based bullying and to pressure school districts to protect
students by requiring that federal agencies financing education es-
tablish rules prohibiting certain types of discrimination."r One De-
partment of Justice Civil Rights Division official proposed that the
federal government should protect LGBT students from bullying
because "today's bullies become tomorrow's hate crime defendants,
and we're doing all that we can to ensure that school districts take
reports of bullying and harassment seriously."65 Two months later,
the Department of Justice reiterated that it is important to hold
school districts liable for LGBT discrimination under Title IX's pro-
hibition of harassment based on gender stereotypes. 66 However, the
DOE and other agencies do not treat all LGBT discrimination as
gender-based discrimination.
67
Two bills currently pending in Congress address LGBT bullying:
the Student Non-Discrimination Act of 2011 (SNDA) and the Safe
Schools Improvement Act of 2011 (SSIA) .68 The SNDA protects
both LGBT and LGBT-perceived students from harassment that is
"sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive to limit a student's abil-
ity to participate in [a school program] .. .or to create a hostile or
abusive educational environment ... including acts of verbal, non-
verbal, or physical aggression... ."69 The SNDA would be enforced
through a federal agency determination, with Executive approval,
to restrict educational funding to programs that violate non-dis-
crimination laws.70 If the agency determines that its funds are going
to such programs, it may refuse to continue funding the program,
and must report to Congress its decision to restrict funding.
7'
The SSIA aims to prevent bullying based on a number of charac-
teristics, including sexual orientation and gender identity. 72 The
64. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1682 (West 2012).
65. Matt Nosanchuk, Senior Counselor to Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights
Division, Keynote Address at the Central District of Illinois Hate Crimes Summit 6 (Jan. 10,
2012), http://www'justice.gov/crt/about/crm/documents/speechpeoria.pdf; see also Matt
Nosanchuk, On the Road in Peoria: Combating Hate, One Community at a Time, WHITE HOUSE
(Feb. 6, 2012 3:39 PM EST), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/02/06/road-peoria-
combating-hate-one-community-ime.
66. Erica Demarest, Justice Department's LGBT Liaison Talks Bullying, Hate Crimes, WINDY
Crrv TIMES (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.windycitymediagroup.com/lgbt/Justice-
Departments-LGBT-liaison-talks-bullying-hate-crimes/36686.html.
67. Piacenti, supra note 37, at 63-67.
68. Student Non-Discrimination Act of 2011, S. 555, 112th Cong. (2011); Safe Schools
Improvement Act of 2011, S. 506, 112th Cong. (2011).
69. S. 555, §§ 2(b) (2), 3(a)(3).
70. Id. §§ 4-5.
71. Id.
72. S. 506, § 2(5).
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SSIA would require states to publicly and biennially report on "inci-
dent reports by school officials, anonymous student surveys, and
anonymous teacher, administrator .... and other school personnel
surveys reported to the State on a school-by-school basis ... ," The
SSIA would also require each school to annually report to parents
and students the "numbers and nature of bullying and harassment
incidents."74 Although these efforts would educate parents about
what each school's officials know, this requirement would not nec-
essarily increase each school district administration's awareness of
the extent of bullying in its halls if the district administrators do not
receive these reports. Moreover, the SSIA's delegation of the re-
porting requirement to local school officials insulates school district
administrations from the obligation to become aware of the bully-
ing in the schools that they supervise. Although these efforts re-
spond to both the problem of bullying in schools and the national
interest in teaching children to respect each other's differences, 75
without a federal law that includes a notification requirement,
LGBT students may not use the courts as effectively to protect their
right to equal protection.
II. SCHOOL DISTRICT LIABILITY AND THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
This section lays out the legal arguments necessary to successfully
litigate against school districts that do not treat LGBT-bullied stu-
dents equally with other bullied students. The section begins by
describing the legal framework under which attorneys can sue
school districts for equal protection violations. It then explains how
Title VII and Title IX have influenced the equal protection analysis.
Specifically, it examines how the courts expanded the traditional
standard for an equal protection violation-the discriminatory pur-
pose standard-to include deliberate indifference. Subsequently,
this section evaluates the ten federal opinions that have addressed
this type of action and provides lessons from these rulings about
how to establish liability. Lastly, this section discusses jury verdicts
and settlement agreements in LGBT harassment cases to demon-
strate why such litigation can be lucrative for both LGBT students
and attorneys.
73. Id. at § 3. Note that this report would be made directly to the State, rather than to
the school district.
74. Id.
75. See Thomas E. Perez, Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr. Annual Lecture: Civil Rights in 2011
and Beyond, 54 HoWARD L.J. 425, 432-34 (2011).
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A. Monell Liability
Three legal provisions render school districts liable for violating
students' right to equal protection: the Equal Protection Clause, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and municipal liability as established in Monell v. De-
partment of Social Services.76 After the states ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment, the federal government enacted the Ku Klux Klan
Act, which includes language now codified as § 1983, to create a
private right to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. 77 This statute
allows citizens to sue any "person" who acts under the color of state
authority to deprive citizens of their rights under the Constitu-
tion. 78 In Monell, the Supreme Court held that § 1983 liability ex-
tends to "municipalities and other local government units. 79
Because school districts are local government units, LGBT students
can sue towns or school boards under § 1983 for depriving them of
the constitutional right to equal protection. 0
Under current law, however, towns or school boards can escape
liability for the inaction of its teachers and administrators who ig-
nore peer-to-peer LGBT bullying. The Supreme Court held in Mo-
nell that municipal liability may exist if a town has a policy or
custom of discrimination that leads to a constitutional tort.,, How-
ever, it also precluded municipal liability under respondeat superior,
which would hold a town liable for the actions of its employees.
8 2
Thus, a court can find a town liable for a policy or custom of dis-
crimination based only on the actions of an administrator with au-
thority to set a policy or establish a custom, 3 but not based on the
actions of employees whose conduct is unauthorized. 4 Typically, a
"policy" is something expressed by the municipality or a municipal
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2006); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 658-59 (1978).
77. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 31, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1981A, 1983, 1988); Steven Stein Cushman, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: Toward
a New Definition of Municipal Policymaker, 34 BC. L. REv. 693, 694 (1993).
78. See § 1983.
79. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
80. See, e.g., Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2003);
Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 460 (7th Cir. 1996); Seiwert v. Spencer-Owen Cmty. Sch.
Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 942, 953 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
81. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. A "constitutional tort" involves "the use of compensatory
damages to vindicate constitutional violations." See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for
Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REv. 82, 100 (1989).
82. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
83. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 470 (1986) (holding that the town
could be liable for the action of a County Prosecutor if that County Prosecutor was given the
power to decide what are the town's policies or customs).
84. See St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 112-13 (1988) (plurality opinion).
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policymaker, while a "custom" is something that is not expressed
but is sufficiently pervasive to have the effect of a policy.
85
Students who experience discriminatory policies or customs and
wish to bring equal protection claims against towns or school dis-
tricts may face a host of social and legal barriers. As an initial mat-
ter, students might be reluctant to report harassment to teachers,
school officials, or school district administrators.8 6 LGBT students
might be particularly reluctant to draw attention to their sexual ori-
entation if they live in an area where residents view their sexual
orientation or gender identity as shameful.87 Even students and
families who are willing to sue might not have sufficient knowledge
about other students' bullying experiences to claim that the school
district treats some victims of bullying differently from others.8 Be-
cause school districts and their employees do not have a general
duty under federal law to protect students from one another's
abuse, they will only be found liable when students can show that
school districts responded differently to LGBT bullying than to
non-LGBT bullying.89 Finally, even when students can show that
LGBT bullied students were treated differently than non-LGBT bul-
lied students, the students still may not be able to overcome school
administrators' immunity defenses,90 or be able to prove that the
school districts were aware of the bullying.91
When students bring equal protection claims under § 1983,
courts may determine, first, whether a student, or a class of stu-
dents, was treated differently from other similarly situated stu-
dents;92 second, what level of scrutiny the court should apply to the
85. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-82 n.10; Melissa L. Koehn, The New American Caste Sys-
tem: The Supreme Court and Discrimination Among Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
49, 76-77 (1998).
86. SeeJames D. Unnever & Dewey G. Cornell, Middle School Victims of Bullying: Who Re-
ports Being Bullied?, 30 AGGRESSrVE BEHAVIOR 373, 373 (2004), available at http://cehsl5.unl.
edu/edps/brnet/files/2007/5/whoreportsbullying.pdf.
87. Cf Michael Kent Curtis, Be Careful What You Wish For: Gays, Dueling High School T-
Shirts, and the Perils of Suppression, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 431, 432-33 (2009).
88. See Martin v. Swartz Creek Gmty. Sch., 419 F. Supp. 2d 967, 975 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
(denying the plaintiff's § 1983 claim because the plaintiff failed to produce evidence that
other similarly situated individuals existed or were treated differently).
89. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1989).
90. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 635-36 (1987) (establishing qualified im-
munity for certain government actions).
91. See Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1124 (E.D. Cal.
2011); Martin, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 973-75; Schroeder ex rel. Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of
Educ., 296 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875-76 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
92. See Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008); Vill. of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000).
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government policy; 93 and, third, whether the government has ajus-
tified interest in treating that student or that class of students differ-
ently.94 To violate the Equal Protection Clause, a policy must have a
discriminatory intent, not merely a disparate impact.95
Students who are bullied because of their LGBT or LGBT-per-
ceived status can use § 1983, Monell, and the Equal Protection
Clause to satisfy the three steps in the equal protection analysis.
LBGT students qualify as a class of persons who may be treated dif-
ferently.96 Although the precise standard of review remains un-
clear,97 even applying the most deferential level of scrutiny-
rational basis review-an LGBT student can still succeed by demon-
strating that the school administration does not have a rational ba-
sis for treating LGBT bullying differently from other bullying.98
B. Title VII and Title IX Impact on Equal Protection for LGBT Students
The standard for school district liability in an equal protection
claim for LGBT bullying is not limited to discriminatory purpose;99
liability also extends to deliberate indifference-a lower threshold
than is normally applied to equal protection claims. 00 Although the
term deliberate indifference originated in Eighth Amendment
cases and was not developed for Equal Protection purposes, 01 the
93. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
94. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964).
95. See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272-73 (1979); Washington v. Da-
vis, 426 U.S. 229, 240, 242 (1976).
96. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
634-36 (1996); Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1134-35 (9th Cir.
2003). Transgender students may face different legal issues when asserting their status as a
class of persons similarly situated but treated differently. See Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging &
Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 658-59 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (collecting and distin-
guishing cases).
97. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some
Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH.
L. REv. 2062, 2266 (2002) (discussing Romer, 517 U.S. 620).
98. See High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (1990).
99. See Flores, 324 F.3d at 1135 (noting that the plaintiffs must show either that the de-
fendants intentionally discriminated or acted with deliberate indifference); see also Gant v.
Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 1999); Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446,
454 (7th Cir. 1996).
100. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272 (both
cases noting that the standard for equal protection cases is discriminatory purpose); see also
Robert Nelson, Note, To Infer or Not to Infer a Discriminatory Purpose: Rethinking Equal Protection
Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 334, 334-35 (1986).
101. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994); Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1977).
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Supreme Court has used the term deliberate indifference when as-
sessing sex-based discrimination under Title IX.102 The lower courts
subsequently incorporated the deliberate indifference standard
into school district liability for LGBT bullying.
0 3
To understand how LGBT bullying cases are litigated, it is first
necessary to understand how Title VI' 0 4 and Title IX105 jurispru-
dence has influenced lower courts' treatment of school district lia-
bility for LGBT bullying. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits employer discrimination "because of' an employee's
sex. 10 6 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits dis-
crimination "on the basis of sex" in schools that receive federal
funding. 107 The Title VII term "because of... sex" 1°us and the Title
IX term "on the basis of sex"109 are inextricably linked by statutory
and common law. 10 Title VII defines both terms using the same
language,"' which has led courts to use the two terms synony-
mously. 112 The similarity between these terms has caused courts to
look to both Title VII and Title IX cases for guidance when decid-
ing what type of sex-based discrimination is prohibited and deter-
mining the threshold of harassment that triggers each statute."
3
The Supreme Court has established four conditions that must be
satisfied for school districts to be held liable for sex-based harass-
ment under Title IX.114 First, the school district must have "actual
knowledge" of the sexual harassment. 15 Second, the school district
102. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
103. See Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
105. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
107. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (2006); see also Barbara HavelkovA, Commentary, Competences of
the Union and Sex Equality: A Comparative Look at the EU and the US, 107 MIcH. L. Ryv. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 139, 139 (2009), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vo107/
havelkova.pdf.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (2006).
109. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006).
110. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999) (using the Title VII
reasoning in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. to determine what action is prohibited in
a Title IX case); Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F.3d 1014, 1023 (7th Cir. 1997)
("It is helpful to look to Tide VII to determine whether the alleged sexual harassment is
severe and pervasive enough to constitute illegal discrimination on the basis of sex for pur-
poses of Title IX.").
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006) ("The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex'
include, but are not limited to [specific conditions.]").
112. See Wolfe v. Fayetteville, Ark. Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 860, 866 (8th Cir. 2011).
113. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999); Metro. Sch. Dist.
Perry Twp., 128 F.3d at 1023.
114. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
115. Id.
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must be "deliberately indifferent" to the sexual harassment. 1 6
Third, the harassment must be "severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive."',17 Fourth, the harassment must deprive a student of edu-
cational opportunities.' 18 It is inapposite, however, to export the
fourth prong from its Title IX context to a constitutional analysis of
an equal protection violation, because the right to equal protection
under the law is a general right not limited by whether a person can
persevere when confronted with unequal treatment.11 9
Despite how beneficial Title VII and Title IX have been for estab-
lishing judicial precedent regarding liability for LGBT bullying, stu-
dents cannot rely on these doctrines alone. The rationale
supporting Title VII and Title IX does not completely apply to stu-
dent-to-student LGBT harassment. In the Title VII claim presented
in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Oil Services, Inc., the Supreme Court
held that Title VII protects employees from same-sex harassment.1 20
The Supreme Court limited this protection to situations involving
an individual's desire or hatred of another based on that person's
sex. 121 Therefore, even if a student satisfies the four elements of
school district liability for in-school harassment, the Title VII ratio-
nale would not protect an LGBT student from harassment based on
LGBT status. 122 Instead, the student must demonstrate that the har-
assment was based on the student's sex, not sexual orientation.
C. Judicial Precedent on School District Liability Under § 1983
The federal judiciary has decided ten cases that address the sum-
mary judgment standard for a § 1983 equal protection claim that a
town or school district did not protect a student from LGBT bully-




119. Predicating Title IX violations on a deprivation of educational opportunities makes
sense because Title IX can only be enforced against schools that receive federal funding. The
purpose of federal funding is to provide students with access to education. Consequently, it
would be inappropriate for a school to receive federal funding and then deprive a student of
the purpose of that funding. The Equal Protection Clause, however, applies to all citizens
regardless of access to education. Therefore, the fourth prong of the Tide IX assessment is
inapplicable in the context of an equal protection violation.
120. 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998); see alsoYvonne Zylan, Finding the Sex in Sexual Harassment:
How Title VI and Tort Schemes Miss the Point of Same-Sex Hostile Environment Harassment, 39 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 391, 393 n.9 (2006).
121. Zylan, supra note 120, at 393 n.9.
122. See id.
123. See supra note 13 (collecting cases).
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the school districts' summary judgment motion, the students were
able to show prolonged, extreme harassment with minimal re-
sponse from the school district.' 24 In two cases, the students lost
because they did not plead sufficient facts on the merits. 125 In four
cases, the students lost because they did not plead any facts alleging
the school district's knowledge of LGBT bullying. 26 In one case,
the student lost because the Court held that Title IX precludes a
§ 1983 claim for a student's equal protection violation.127 These ten
cases provide lessons about what fact patterns are sufficiently severe
or pervasive for future litigants to successfully sue school districts
that did not protect them from LGBT bullying. These cases also
provide insight into the potential value of a federal bullying notifi-
cation law.
1. Lessons from Students' Legal Victories
The cases where plaintiffs defeated school districts' summary
judgment motions share some common factual characteristics.
These cases involved continuous name-calling with anti-LGBT slurs,
often a student-to-student physical attack, and two or more years of
harassment with a minimal response from the school districts.
These common factors gave rise to the courts' determination that a
jury could find a school district liable for deliberate indifference to
the LGBT bullying.
In 1996, Nabozny v. Podlesny became the first case in which a fed-
eral court vindicated a student's equal protection right in a § 1983
suit against a school district that failed to protect a student from
124. Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist, 324 F.3d 1130, 1132-33, 1138 (9th Cir.
2003); Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 451-53, 460 (7th Cir. 1996); Seiwert v. Spencer-
Owen Cmty. Sch. Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 942, 953-54 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
125. Brown v. Ogletree, No. 11-CV-1491, 2012 WL 591190, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21,
2012); Shaposhinkov v. Pacifica Sch. Dist., No. C 04-01288 SI., 2006 WL 931731, at *1, *9
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2006).
126. Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d. 1107, 1118 (E.D. Cal. 2011);
Martin v. Swartz Creek Cmty. Sch., 419 F. Supp. 2d 967, 974 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Drews v. Joint
Sch. Dist. No. 393, No. CV04-388-N-EJL, 2006 WL 851118, at *4, *8 (D. Idaho Mar. 29, 2006);
Schroeder ex rel. Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 2d 869, 871, 875-76 (N.D.
Ohio 2003).
127. Moore v. Marion Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:04-CV-483, 2006 WL 2051687 at *7,
*10 (N.D. Ind. July 19, 2006). The Supreme Court subsequently rejected the argument that
Title IX precludes a § 1983 equal protection action in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555
U.S. 246, 258-59 (2009).
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discrimination based on LGBT status.1 28 Jamie Nabozny was sub-
jected to verbal harassment and physical abuse throughout his mid-
dle school and high school career.129 His peers mistreated him
because of his sexual orientation. 30 Nabozny's verbal harassment
included references to him as a "faggot."'131 His physical abuse in-
cluded: striking him, spitting on him, pushing him to the ground,
holding him down to perform a mock rape on him in front of his
classmates, hitting him in the leg while he was using the urinal and
causing him to fall into the urinal, urinating on him, throwing
metal nuts and bolts at him while he was on the school bus, and
repeatedly kicking him in the stomach for over five minutes. 13 2 This
harassment lasted six years.
133
Although school officials took some minimal steps to protect Na-
bozny from abuse, such as placing two bullies in detention, they
failed to take adequate steps to protect him from future harm and
even belittled his predicament. 34 One school official remarked in
response to the mock rape incident that "boys will be boys" and
that, as a gay male, he should "expect" such treatment from his
peers. 35 Another school official responded to the story of Nabozny
enduring five minutes of kicking by laughing and saying that gay
people deserve such treatment.
36
This case triggered equal protection analysis only because, at the
time, there was a state statute that protected public school students
from discrimination based on sex and sexual orientation. 37 Be-
cause of this law, Nabozny's school enacted a policy of protecting
students from peer-to-peer sexual harassment. 138 The Seventh Cir-
cuit highlighted this policy and stated that the Equal Protection
Clause required the school to enact the policy equally and without
128. 92 F.3d at 449.
129. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 450-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 451.
132. Id. at 451-53.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 451.
135. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1996).
136. Id. at 452.
137. Id. at 453; Wisc. Stat. § 118.13(1) (2009-10) ("[N]o person may be denied... partic-
ipation in . . . any curricular [or] extracurricular ... activity ... because of the person's sex
... [or] sexual orientation.").
138. Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 453.
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"invidious discrimination.' 3 9 Nabozny's holding that an existing pol-
icy must be enacted indiscriminately is binding precedent within
the Seventh Circuit and has been relied on in other jurisdictions.
140
In Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified School District, several students sued
the school district for LGBT bullying that occurred over a seven-
year period.1 41 Incidents included a student who was harassed with
pornography and received notes saying "Die, dyke bitch," and phys-
ical beatings that led to hospitalization. 42 The court held that the
school district's claim that it believed it had been enforcing its non-
harassment policies, combined with its lack of a response to LGBT
bullying, could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the school
district was deliberately indifferent to LGBT bullying. 143
In Seiwert v. Spencer-Owen Community School Corporation, the stu-
dent was kicked, threatened, repeatedly called "faggot," and re-
ceived a death threat communicated through his sister when he was
absent from school. 44 This treatment lasted two years. 45 The court
held that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a jury to
find that the school district violated the student's equal protection
rights, 146 concluding that the school district's departure from its
bullying policies in response to that student's two death threats and
continual harassment was sufficiently egregious that his equal pro-
tection claim for deliberate indifference could proceed.1
47
2. Lessons from Students' Legal Defeats
The two cases where students failed to overcome school districts'
summary judgment motions also share common characteristics.
Both cases involved continuous anti-LGBT name-calling but only
one incident of physical violence. Both cases also involved harass-
ment that continued for approximately two years-a shorter dura-
tion than the successful cases discussed above. In these two cases,
the quality of the schools' responses to the harassment was quite
different. In Estate of Brown v. Ogletree, the school district expressed
139. Id. (quoting Harris v. McRae, 48 U.S. 297, 322 (1980)).
140. See T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2010); Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified
Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003); Doe v. Galster, No. 09-C-1089, 2011 WL
2784159, at *7-8 (E.D. Wis. July 14, 2011).
141. 324 F.3d at 1132.
142. Id. at 1133.
143. Id. at 1135.
144. 497 F. Supp. 2d 942, 951, 1132 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
145. Id. at 947.
146. Id. at 954.
147. Id. at 952.
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indifference toward the student's harassment. In Shaposhnikov v.
Pacifica School District, the school district lacked a sufficient response
to the student's and father's complaints. These cases teach an im-
portant lesson: school districts will only be held liable for deliberate
indifference when its members know about LGBT bullying and the
district administrators respond in a manner that treats LGBT stu-
dents differently from non-LGBT students. This observation, com-
bined with the fact that four of the ten federal cases were dismissed
because the school district was not sufficiently aware of the bullying,
provides proof of the need for bullying notification laws. Notifica-
tion laws would help ensure that school districts are aware of bully-
ing problems and that LGBT students have access to the
information necessary to demonstrate whether their school district
responds differently to LGBT bullying than to non-LGBT bullying.
In Ogletree, the school district's motion for summary judgment
was granted despite its awareness of, and lack of response to, more
than two years of LGBT bullying.1 4s The student, Asher Brown,
committed suicide following peer-to-peer bullying about his sexual
orientation. 49 Asher's peersjoked that he had AIDS by naming him
"AsherAIDS" and called him "gay," "faggot," and "queer."' 50 He was
also thrown down a staircase.1 5' Asher and his parents filed com-
plaints to the school district, but the school board did not return
the family's messages.' 52 After Asher's death, a member of the
school board commented "don't worry, Asher complained about
everything, always filled out incident reports .... [H] e would even
complain that it was a Wednesday or that the wind blew in his
face." 153 Although bullies targeted Asher because of his sexual ori-
entation, the equal protection claim was rooted in gender discrimi-
nation.1 54 The court found, however, that the plaintiff merely listed
bullying incidents involving male and female victims. 55 Conse-
quently, it granted the school district's motion for summary judg-
ment, finding that the evidence presented was insufficient to
discern a difference between the school district's response to male
148. Brown v. Ogletree, No. 11-CV-1491, 2012 WL 591190, at *2, *12 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21,
2012).
149. Id. at *2.
150. Id. at *1.
151. Id. at *2.
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting the record).
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and female bullying-an essential element in an equal protection
claim. 156
In Shaposhnikov, the student's peers taunted him about his sexual
orientation because he dressed conservatively and danced competi-
tively.157 This harassment lasted for two years. 158 One peer warned
the student during an athletic event not to "break his fingernails."
He also received a death threat, which the school deemed not seri-
ous, and another student accused him of bankrupting the school
district with his complaints. 15 9 In response to these and similar ac-
tions, the school gave the bullies warnings and suspensions.16 0 The
court acknowledged that the student raised an equal protection
claim, but dismissed the Title IX claim because it found that the
school district did not act with deliberate indifference,161 because
the district administrators investigated or responded to every inci-
dent they knew about.
162
D. Monetary Damages: Settlement Agreements and Jury Awards
Some lawyers are motivated by money.163 Congress passed the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 to provide attorneys
with a financial incentive to help people whose rights were violated
by the government. 6 4 This Act benefits lawyers undertaking § 1983
litigation, including cases that vindicate claims against school dis-
tricts for violating LGBT students' equal protection rights. 6 5 Pro-
spective LGBT student plaintiffs and their attorneys should be
aware of previous jury awards and settlement agreements to under-
stand how much financial compensation is at stake when the school
156. Id.
157. Shaposhinkov v. Pacifica Sch. Dist., No. C 04-01288 SI., 2006 WL 931731, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 11, 2006).
158. Id. at *3.
159. Id. at *5-6.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *3.
162. Id. at *7-8.
163. Compare David Arkush, Note, Preserving "Catalyst" Attorney's Fees Under the Freedom of
Information Act in the Wake ofBuckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department
of Health and Human Resources, 37 HAsv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 131, 157 (2002); Lester Brick-
man, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, UCLA L. REv.
29, 102 (1989); Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Pivate Enforcement,
86 NoTRE DAm[E L. REv. 1413, 1452-53 (2011), with Eve Brensike Primus, The Illusory Right to
Counse4 37 OHio N.U. L. REv. 597, 603-04 (2011); Ailsa Chang, Not Enough Money or Time to
Defend Detroit's Poor, NATIONAL PunRuc RADIo (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates
/story/story.php?storyld=l 11811319.
164. See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006).
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district is held liable for such a deprivation of rights. Moreover,
school districts should be aware of the potential monetary costs of
discriminating against LGBT students.
1. Settlement Agreements
LGBT student plaintiffs and their school districts should be
aware of the financial damages that similarly situated plaintiffs have
received to understand the scale of past financial remedies for cer-
tain discrimination. For example, Nabozny and Flores, discussed
above, resulted in settlement awards of $962,000 and $1.1 million,
respectively. 166 In 2002, another settlement agreement in a claim by
an LGBT bullied youth totaled $451,000.167 A decade or more has
passed since these agreements, however, and settlement amounts
have decreased in recent years. 168 The Department of Justice re-
leased information about two settlement agreements between stu-
dents and their school districts for LGBT bullying that are
illustrative of the facts underlying contemporary LGBT bullying liti-
gation and awards.1 69 In Lovins v. Pleasant Hill Public School District,
R-III, Jeremy Lovins alleged that his peers harassed him because of
his sex and perceived sexual orientation for four years. 170 Lovins
claimed that the school district officials were aware of the harass-
ment and did not take "immediate and appropriate corrective ac-
tions."17' Lovins settled his claims for $72,500, including attorneys'
fees. 7
2
The settlement agreement in Lovins also required "all District
employees to promptly report, to the principal or a compliance co-
ordinator[,] . . . harassment that they observe, are informed of, or
166. Students; Know Your Rights, S. POVERTYL. CENTER, http://www.spicenter.org/what-we-
do/lgbt-rights/students-know-your-rights (last visited Aug. 15, 2012) [hereinafter S. PoVERrY
L. CENTER].
167. Groundbreaking Legal Settlement is First to Recognize Constitutional Rights of Gay and Les-
bian Students to be Out at School & Protected from Harassment, LAMBDA LEGAL (Aug. 28, 2002),
http://ww.ambdalegal.org/news/ca-20020828-groundbreaking-legal-settlement-first-to-
recognize.
168. Compare S. POVERTY L. CENTER, supra note 166 (discussing settlement awards upwards
of $325,000), with J.L. v. Mohawk Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 09-CV-943, at 2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29,
2010) (Stipulation and Settlement Agreement), available at http://www.justice.goN/crt/
about/edu/documents/mhawksettlepdf ($72,500 awarded).
169, Educational Opportunities Cases, DEPARTMENT oF JusTIcE, http://www.justice.gov/
crt/about/edu/documents/classlist.php (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
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reasonably suspect" and to "identify to whom at each school in the
District and at the District's central office such allegations should
be reported.' 173 It is instructive that the agreement also requires the
school to keep extensive records, which are to be supplied to the
superintendent. 174 In effect, the agreement requires from one
school what this Note seeks to mandate for all public schools: a bot-
tom-up bullying notification requirement.
In J.L. v. Mohawk Central School District, the School District and
the student's family settled for a payment of $50,000 and reim-
bursement for counseling sessions up to $100 per week for approxi-
mately three years. 175 The School District also paid attorneys' fees to
the New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation in the amount of
$25,000. 176 The case involved a male student whose peers subjected
him to more than two years of intimidation, verbal harassment, and
physical abuse because he did not conform to traditional male gen-
der norms.
177
The jL. settlement agreement also required that school staff be
trained in managing student bullying. 7 8 The school was required to
hire an expert to conduct annual training exercises that "include
an emphasis on the affirmative obligation of staff to identify and
report potential incidents of. . . bullying, and harassment based
on . . . sexual orientation." 179 The school board was required to
issue compliance reports with summaries of the bullying reports,
investigations, and results of complaints. 180 These financial out-
comes and non-financial settlement conditions give future bullying
victims and their attorneys a foundation for dispute resolution ne-
gotiations with school districts.
2. Jury Awards
Juries have found school districts liable for amounts ranging
from $27,000 to $300,000 for LGBT bullying claims brought under
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. No. 09-CV-943, at 2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010) (Stipulation and Settlement Agree-
ment), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/mohawksettle.pdf.
176. Id.
177. See J.L. v. Mohawk Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 6:09-CV-943, at 3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2010)
(Motion to Intervene), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/
mohawkmotion.pdf.
178. J.L. v. Mohawk Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 09-CV-943, at 2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010)
(Stipulation and Settlement Agreement), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu
/documents/mohawksetle.pdf
179. Id.
180. Id. at 3-4.
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Title IX.181 These jury verdict amounts give an indication of the
awards that today's LGBT students and their attorneys might re-
ceive if they win at trial, as a number of these awards were deter-
mined within the past decade. l 2 Because of the similarity between
the underlying facts in certain Title IX claims and equal protection
violations, students may use these awards to assess a reasonable
range of damages. The Title IX-related damages are therefore in-
structive for school districts and bullying victims when quantifying
the school districts' appropriate financial responsibility for LGBT
bullying-related equal protection violations.
In Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified School District No. 464, the jury
found the school district liable to the student for $250,00013 and
awarded attorneys' fees and expenses of $268,793.51,184 an outcome
that vindicated both the rights of the student and the efforts of the
attorney. Dylan's peers had perceived him to be LGBT and sub-
jected him to continual verbal harassment for approximately five
years. 18 5 In addition to being called "faggot" and other derogatory
terms, students screamed at him "Dylan sucks cock," and "Dylan
likes men."''8 6 He had slurs written in the dust on his car and donuts
smeared on his car. 8 7 A number of these incidents resulted in phys-
ical altercations. 88 The court, citing the Title VII case Oncale, af-
firmed the jury's verdict based on its ability to draw "reasonable
inferences" from the social context of these incidents.8 9 Theno illus-
trates the potential benefit of LGBT bullying-related litigation for
both students and their attorneys.
181. Juries have awarded damages of the following amounts: $27,000; $60,000; $125,000;
$175,000; $220,000; and $300,000. The Cost of Harassment 1, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/files
/pdfs/Igbt/schoolsyouth/costofharassment.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2012) [hereinafter The
Cost of Harassment]; see alsoVance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 258, 264 (6th
Cir. 2000).
182. The Cost of Harassment, supra note 181, at 1.
183. 394 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1301 (D. Kan. 2005) (assessing the merits of the case).
184. Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 404 F. Supp.2d 1281, 1292 (D.
Kan. 2005) (determining attorneys' fees).
185. See Theno, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1305-06 (discussing harassment from seventh grade
through eleventh grade).
186. See id. at 1305.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1305-06.
189. Id. at 1307.
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III. PROBLEMS ESTABLISHING SCHOOL DISTRICT
LIABILITY FOR LGBT BULLYING
This section explains why LGBT students continue to encounter
difficulty when suing school districts that fail to treat them equally
with other bullied students. First, it shows that current bullying laws
do not increase school districts' awareness of LGBT bullying be-
cause information about bullying is filtered down to teachers, in the
form of policies, rather than up to administrators. This is a problem
because school district administrators' awareness of bullying is an
essential component of equal protection claims. Next, this section
addresses the difficulty in drawing a meaningful line between ac-
tionable and non-actionable bullying. Lastly, this section discusses
recent changes in litigation pleading standards and how these
changes may affect LGBT bullying lawsuits.
A. The Problem with Bullying Laws that Do Not increase School Board
Awareness of Students' Equal Protection Violations
State bullying laws do not go far enough to protect LGBT stu-
dents. School district administrators must first receive notice of a
problem in order to be liable for deliberate indifference to student
bullying.' 90 This makes sense because deliberate indifference in-
volves an element of discrimination, and it would not be rational to
accuse a board of having a culpable state of mind when it is not
aware of the situation.' 9 ' This detrimental gap in many state notifi-
cation laws is perpetuated by the absence of a federal requirement
that administrators receive bullying notifications. Despite this essen-
tial flaw, some state laws do include limited attempts to alleviate
student bullying through increased reporting of such harassment.
The Illinois bullying statute, for example, involves a top-down
declaration from the state legislature to local governments that they
must develop a general bullying policy.' 92 The statute includes a
bottom-up requirement that schools file their bullying policies with
the State Board of Education,' 93 but lacks specific guidance for what
provisions should be included in the bullying policies. Although
190. See, e.g., Schroeder ex ret. Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 2d 869,
871, 875-76 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
191. Cf Gant ex rel. Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ. 195 F.3d 134, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1999)
(describing a situation in which the school district was not found liable for deliberate indif-
ference because it was not sufficiently aware of the harassment).
192. 105 ILL. CoMp. STAT. § 5/27-23.7 (West Supp. 2012).
193. Id. at § 5/27-23.7(d).
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there is oversight for the filing requirement, there is no mechanism
to ensure compliance if the town fails to develop an adequate bully-
ing policy. The absence of an enforcement mechanism may result
from the lack of a provision that articulates what would be an ade-
quate bullying policy.
19 4
North Carolina's bullying statute has a bottom-up approach, but
lacks a requirement that school officials who are aware of bullying
inform an outside school district administrator. 195 Consequently,
the North Carolina scheme does not compel schools to inform any
outside body that provides oversight, like a school district. Nor does
this law expand municipal liability for LGBT bullying because it
does not require a school board to be aware of the harassment-a
necessary element of liability.
New Hampshire's bullying legislation contains a provision assert-
ing that the legislation should not be interpreted to create a new
cause of action. 196 This provision could be read to decrease a stu-
dent's ability to assert in a suit that the school board has a custom
of discrimination. For example, under the Sixth Circuit's rationale
that awareness is a prerequisite for liability, even if the notification
law gives school boards heightened awareness, there would remain
the question of whether a school board's liability resulting from
such awareness arose out of a law that explicitly precluded a new
cause of action. 197 At a minimum, it is uncertain whether the stat-
ute's prohibition of new causes of action would prevent a court
from finding liability from the notification law's effect of increasing
school district awareness.
In many cases, parents are the ones who notify the school board
or the municipal authority of their children's harassment. Some
students, however, do not have involved parents to notify officials
on their behalf. These students would derive less protection from
bullying laws that do not require staff reporting. With lower rates of
reporting, there would be less pressure from the school district ad-
ministrators to remedy bullying. If Congress enacted a law requir-
ing school staff to inform school district administrators about
instances of harassment, then local authorities would be more likely
to act regardless of parental action or inaction.
194. Id.
195. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.15(d) (2011).
196. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193-F:9 (2008 & Supp. 2011).
197. See Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 263-64 (6th cir. 2000)
(discussing awareness of potential harm as a substantial factor for liability).
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B. The Unclear Threshold for a Municipal Custom of
Deliberate Indifference Toward Students' Equal Protection
It is difficult to establish municipal liability for a discriminatory
response to bullying. In a recent discrimination case that inspired a
California law protecting LGBT bullying victims, the plaintiffs at-
torney did not bring a federal claim against the school district for
discrimination, but instead brought a discrimination claim against
the school district under the State Constitution. 198 This omission
was intentional and is demonstrative of the status of federal equal
protection law as applied to school districts. The attorney specifi-
cally brought a claim for "discrimination by all the defendants, ex-
cept the School District, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."' 99 A problem confronting plaintiffs
in cases like this is the paucity of successful suits against school
boards for a custom of deliberate indifference and, accordingly, few
examples of the type of evidence needed to demonstrate deliberate
indifference. 2
00
Before 2009, few courts issued opinions involving these types of
equal protection claims, perhaps because some courts dismissed
students' equal protection arguments under the theory that
Title IX barred additional claims under § 1983.201 The courts
barred these claims because of the Supreme Court's holding in
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Associa-
tion202 that § 1983 claims were barred if Congress passed a law in-
tended to be the exclusive remedy for a specific type of claim.
20 3
Although the Seventh Circuit did not apply this reasoning in Na-
bozny, 20 4 some courts had read Sea Clammers to mean that the pas-
sage of Title IX precluded § 1983 litigation based on students'
198. SeeWalsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1113, 1123-24 (E.D.
Cal. 2011); California Governor Signs 'Seth's Law' Anti-Bullying Measure, Two Transgender Rights
Bills, LGBTQ NATION (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.lgbtqnation.com/2011/10/california-
governor-signs-seths-law-anti-bullying-measure-two-transgender-rights-bills/.
199. Walsh, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 1113 (emphasis added).
200. Although constitutional torts alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause nor-
mally require a discriminatory purpose as the standard, the school discrimination cases dis-
cussed in this Note use the standard of deliberate indifference.
201. See, e.g., Leach v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., No. EV98-0196-C-Y/H, 2000
WL 33309376, at *12 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2000) (holding that the school district's alleged
failure to address sexual harassment of female students, which denied females an education
equal to that of males, was within the scope of Title IX and thus preempted and barred by Sea
Clammers).
202. See 453 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1981).
203. Id. at 20 ("When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently
comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy
of suits under § 1983.").
204. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
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claims of discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
ClauseY°5 Application of Sea Clammers had inhibited the develop-
ment of a legal standard for the burden a student must meet to
demonstrate that a school district has a custom of discriminating
against a specific class of bullied students.
In 2009, the Supreme Court removed the Sea Clammers impedi-
ment in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, which held that Title
IX does not preclude a § 1983 action for gender discrimination in
schools that fail to prevent peer-to-peer sexual harassment. 2 6 Now
all courts may confront cases that require them to determine what
circumstances constitute a school district custom of violating a stu-
dents' right to equal protection from LGBT bullying. After Fitzger-
ald, the time has come to establish criteria for how a court should
determine when a school board has a custom of deliberate
indifference.2
07
Precedent in this area highlights the importance of informing
school boards of discriminatory harassment. In Schroeder ex rel.
Schroeder v. Maumee Board of Education, the court held that, although
a student endured harassment, including repeatedly being called a
"fag" and having his head hit into a urinal, the equal protection
claim against the school board should be dismissed because no
member of the board or the superintendent knew about the inci-
dents.2 08 Thus there could be no purposeful discrimination to sup-
port an equal protection claim.20 9 When boards are informed, on
the other hand, courts look to a Title IX standard to determine the
threshold for violation of students' rights.
210
Lower courts have adopted the standard of "severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive" to determine when a school district's un-
responsiveness to LGBT bullying violates the Equal Protection
Clause.2 1 1 This standard derives from the Supreme Court's Title IX
205. See, e.g., Doe v. Allentown Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 536671, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2009);
Leach, 2000 WL 33309376 at *12.
206. 555 U.S. 246, 248-49 (2009).
207. Id. at 248 (declining to address, in the first instance, the merits of the plaintiffs'
claims and the sufficiency of their pleadings).
208. 296 F. Supp. 2d 869, 871, 875-76 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
209. Id. at 874 (noting that to succeed, the plaintiff must show either that the defendants
intentionally discriminated against him or acted with deliberate indifference).
210. Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist, 324 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003) ("We
agree with the other circuits that have considered similar issues that the plaintiffs must show
either that the defendants intentionally discriminated or acted with deliberate
indifference.").
211. See, e.g., Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 966
(D. Kan. 2005); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bellefonte Area Sch. Dist., No. 4:CV-02-1463, 2003 WL
23718302, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2003).
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case Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education.2 12 There, the Court's
benchmark for "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" was
that the school district had notice that the "victim-students [we]re
effectively denied equal access to an institution's resources and op-
portunities. ' 213 Under this analysis, the right deprived is equal pro-
tection under a school's general bullying policy.
Three jarring fact patterns of student harassment shed light on
what the courts consider to be severe, pervasive, and objectively of-
fensive in an LGBT bullying context. In Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bellefonte
Area School District, the court held that three years of oral harass-
ment, including remarks such as "fag" and "gay boy" were "suffi-
ciently severe to trigger liability under Title IX."214 In Patterson v.
Hudson Area Schools, the court held that there was a genuine issue of
material fact about whether a school district was deliberately indif-
ferent under Title IX when a student was repeatedly called names
during a three-year period, including "faggot," "gay," and "queer,"
more than 200 times in just one of those years.215 Lastly, in Theno v.
Tonganoxie Unified School District No. 464, the court denied a motion
for summary judgment, finding that ajury could hold a school dis-
trict liable for rarely taking measures "beyond merely talking to and
warning the harassers" when bullies routinely called a student
names such as "faggot," 'Jack-off boy," "banana boy," and
"flamer."216 The court held that years of such harassment met the
sufficiently severe and pervasive standard.2 17
C. The Pleading Standard Problem in § 1983 Litigation
A newly heightened pleading standard may pose difficulties for
students alleging that a school district has a policy or custom of
discrimination. Although this Note's proposed legislation would
not alter the pleading requirement, it would provide publicly availa-
ble information about past occurrences of LGBT bullying to help
future plaintiffs meet the heightened pleading requirement and
demonstrate the existence of a discriminatory custom. 2 18
212. 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
213. See id. at 651 (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1999))
(comparing a Title IX example of deprived access to a school facility to a Title VII creation of
an abusive work environment).
214. 2003 WL 23718302, at *2, *8.
215. 551 F.3d 438, 438, 440 (6th Cir. 2009).
216. 377 F. Supp. 2d at 956-58, 966, 968.
217. Id. at 963.
218. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666-67 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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In 2007, the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly
ruled that a complaint must meet a new "plausible" standard, which
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that a viable claim is more
than just "conceivable. '219 In 2009, the Supreme Court held in Ash-
croft v. Iqbal that a pleading alleging a Bivens violation 220 must
demonstrate "purposeful discrimination"-which requires "under-
taking a course of action" more than simply an awareness of a dis-
criminatory effect-and that a decision maker took a course of
action because of its adverse effect on the person's membership in a
specific demographic.
221
Taken together, these two cases require that a plaintiff plausibly,
not merely conceivably, allege that an official acted with discrimina-
tory intent or deliberate indifference to adversely affect the plain-
tiff.222 This raises the pleading threshold twofold in the context of
school board liability for discriminatory handling of peer-to-peer
bullying. First, Twombly forces students' attorneys to ask what is nec-
essary in order to plausibly, rather than merely conceivably, allege
that the school board was deliberately indifferent to the students'
harassment. With plausibility as the new threshold, this Note's pro-
posed legislation would both add to and detract from the difficulty
of filing a pleading that would survive a motion for summary judg-
ment. It would benefit plaintiffs by creating more publicly available
information about LGBT bullying, through both a mandatory re-
porting requirement and a mandatory publication requirement.
22 3
The notification law would also, however, increase the difficulty of
filing a successful pleading if no notifications existed because it
would be more difficult to claim a plausible custom of discrimina-
tion without such mandatory notifications in the school district's
records.
224
Second, Iqbal, in asserting that purposeful discrimination in a su-
pervisory liability context requires not mere knowledge but also ac-
tion based on discriminatory intent,225 raises the question of
219. 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
220. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics lawsuits are the fed-
eral counterparts to § 1983 lawsuits against states. 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Isabella Ruth Ed-
mundson, Note, Imprisoned by Liability: Why Bivens Suits Should Not Be Available Against
Employees of Privately Run Prisons, 45 GA. L. REv. 1127, 1133 (2011).
221. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666-67.
222. See id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
223. For more on the publication requirement, see infra Part 1.D.
224. See id.
225. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court states "vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983
suits." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). However, there would be no vicarious
liability claim if the government supervisors were aware of the discriminatory actions. Shel-
don Nahmod, Constitutional Torts, Over-Deterrence and Supervisory Liability After Iqbal, 14 LEwis &
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whether it is sufficient for a pleading to state that a school district
has a custom of discrimination through inaction in the face of
known LGBT bullying. Although municipal liability does not in-
volve supervisory liability, and thus can be distinguished from Iqbal,
the decision demonstrates a trend towards protecting the govern-
ment from allegations of discriminatory intent absent a showing of
an affirmative discriminatory action. If this standard is applied to
the municipal liability context, then notification laws may increase
the likelihood that school board members would discuss LGBT bul-
lying and decide whether to instruct employees to respond to
LGBT peer-to-peer harassment. Such an action would then meet
Iqbals pleading threshold for discriminatory intent.
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORM AND MONELL LIABILITY
This section proposes a federal bullying notification law. It dis-
cusses why such notification laws are valuable and how Congress has
authority to enact notification laws for state-run school districts. It
also proposes specific language for the notification law, which
would effectively make school districts aware of LGBT bullying and
attach liability to them if they have a policy or custom of deliberate
indifference to that bullying. Finally, this section addresses con-
cerns about the effects of this reform on both school district liability
and on federalism.
The proposed reform is structured to help solve the current
problem and perception that § 1983 suits are difficult to win 22 6 be-
cause it may be difficult to draw a connection between peer bully-
ing and school board inaction.227 A reporting requirement creates
evidence of school districts' responses to bullying because the re-
ports help ensure that school districts are made aware of any inci-
dents of bullying in their schools, including discriminatory bullying.
A. Reporting Requirement
Required reporting mechanisms increase transparency and ac-
countability of government decisions. Increased accountability can
CLARK L. Riv. 279, 290-91 (2010); see alsolqbal, 556 U.S. at 690 (SouterJ., dissenting) (high-
lighting that the government officials "conceded ... if they had 'actual knowledge' of dis-
crimination by their subordinates and exhibited 'deliberate indifference' to that
discrimination," then they would be liable).
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either cause officials to behave differently or cause the public to
pressure the government to change course. 22 8 Increasing school dis-
trict liability is likely to decrease school districts' discriminatory
treatment of LGBT bullying because school officials are less likely
to discriminate against minorities when they must justify their ac-
tions or inaction. 229 The utility of reporting requirements to mar-
shal public resources to effect change is based, in part, on the
reflexive law approach, which seeks reform through mechanisms,
like reporting, that do not involve direct legal intervention.2 30 In-
creased transparency in government decisions can motivate proac-
tive change. It can also motivate change through litigation, which
forces school district officials to justify their actions, minimize their
exposure to potential liability, and decrease the likelihood of future
discrimination. 231 Reporting requirements have been advocated
and enacted in a variety of situations, such as race-based housing
discrimination, 232 federal contractor hiring,233 presidential signing
statements, 2 4 Medicaid fraud,235 corporate social reporting,23 6 envi-
ronmental regulation, 23v and securities law. 238
Required reporting could also benefit victims and potential vic-
tims of LGBT bullying. Reporting helps identify when discrimina-
tion has occurred. 239 However, as discussed above, certain students
are often reluctant to self-report discriminatory practices. 240
228. Cf Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1227, 1231-32
(1995).
229. See Michael Dobbs & William D. Crano, Outgroup Accountability in the Minimal Group
Paradigm: Implications for Aversive Discrimination and Social Identity Theory, 27 PERSONAj.ITY AND
Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 355, 363 (2001).
230. See Orts, supra note 228, at 1232 ("[A] theory of reflexive law proposes an alternative
approach to law reform. It focuses on enhancing self-referential capacities of social systems
and institutions outside the legal system, rather than direct intervention of the legal system
itself through agencies, highly detailed statutes, or delegation of great power to courts.").
231. See Malinda Lee, Comment, Reorienting the Debate on Presidential Signing Statements: The
Need for Transparency in the President's Constitutional Objections, Reservations, and Assertions of
Power, 55 UCLA L. R v. 705, 733-34 (2008); see also Dobbs & Crano, supra note 229, at 363.
232. John P. Relman, Components of a Model Consent Decree-Recordkeeping and Reporting, 1
Hous. DiSCRiM. PRACT. MANUAL § 7:10 (2011).
233. Applicability of the Affirmative Action Program Requirement, 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.40
(2012).
234. Lee, supra note 231, at 733.
235. Mt. CODE. ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 2-611(a) (West 2012).
236. See David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsive-
ness, 25J. CoRp. L. 41, 47 (1999).
237. See Orts, supra note 228, at 1231.
238. Id. at 1232.
239. See Winnie F. Taylor, Eliminating Racial Discrimination in the Suhprime Mortgage Market:
Proposals for Fair Lending Reform, 18 J. L. & POL'y 263, 287 (2009).
240. See supra Part I.A; Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Culture Matters: Cultural Differences in the
Reporting of Employment Discrimination Claims, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 405, 407 (2011).
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Though some victims or observers may be afraid to report when it is
optional, mandatory reporting requirements provide school staff
with social protection by removing their discretion and requiring
them to report.
2 41
Reporting requirements are sometimes controversial, especially
at the intersection of civil liberties and public safety.2 42 For exam-
ple, local school districts may not want the public to know if they
are disregarding students' verbal or physical altercations. Another
potential controversy stems from the publication of the victims'
names. The problem of name-based reporting, however, could eas-
ily be alleviated with unique identifier-based reporting.2 43 Given
that not all hate crimes are currently reported, an increased rate of
reporting could lead to the erroneous perception that the fre-
quency of discrimination has increased.244 However, it may merely
be the case that reporting of the actual statistics is becoming more
accurate. 245 At a minimum, reports of harassment would be evi-
dence of bullying incidents, 246 which would cause authorities and
the general public to become aware of bullying when it occurs.
247
B. Congressional Authority to Enact LGBT Bullying Notification Laws
There are three provisions in the Constitution that provide Con-
gress with authority to enact this Note's proposed notification legis-
lation affecting federally funded schools: the Spending Clause, the
Equal Protection Clause, and the Commerce Clause. 248 In 2011, the
House of Representatives amended its rule for how members of
241. See Hess, supra note 236, at 81-82; see also Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current
Whistleblower Laws: Defending A More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REv.
1633, 1668 (2008) ("[S] tates should allow employees to report either internally or externally
to any government agency so long as the employee possesses an objectively and subjectively
reasonable belief that the report's recipient can alter the employer's unlawful conduct.").
242. See Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The "Names Debate": The Case for Na-
tional HIV Reporting in the United States, 61 AI. L. REv. 679, 683-84 (1998).
243. See Stacey D. Blayer, Note, But Names Will Never Hurt Me: HIV Surveillance &
Mandatory Reporting, 39 B.C. L. REv. 1175, 1186-87 (1998) (discussing the option of reporting
specific individuals by a number instead of a name).
244. See SallyJ. Greenberg, The Massachusetts Hate Crime Reporting Act of 1990: Great Expecta-
tions Yet Unfulfilled?, 31 NEW ENG. L. REv. 103, 106 (1996).
245. See id.
246. See id. at 107.
247. See id. at 158.
248. U.S. CONs-r. art. 1, § 8, cls. 1, 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Congress cite the constitutional authority for their proposed legisla-
tion.249 Previously, a House rule required that each bill's report con-
tain a statement citing the bill's constitutional authority for
enacting the law.250 Now, clause 7(c) of House Rule XII requires
that all bills must be introduced with a statement in the Congres-
sional Record, citing the source of constitutional authority for the
legislation. 251 This Note recommends that members of Congress
cite to the Spending, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clauses for
the sources of constitutional authority for the proposed notification
legislation.
Although the Constitution does not specifically grant Congress
authority to regulate elementary and secondary school educa-
tion, 25 2 the Spending Clause gives Congress power to direct funds
for a public purpose. 253 The spending power requires that the legis-
lation satisfy five conditions: that it be for the general welfare, with
unambiguous conditions, in the federal interest for a particular
program, without compelling states to act unconstitutionally, and
that it not be coercive. 254 A national bullying notification law would
satisfy all five conditions. Student safety and a productive learning
environment are part of the general welfare. Specifying parameters
for how teachers and school administrators report instances of bul-
lying would make the notification law unambiguous. The federal
government has an interest in the success of its funding for elemen-
tary and secondary education programs. There is nothing unconsti-
tutional about protecting the dignity and welfare of LGBT and
LGBT-perceived individuals. Lastly, the extent to which the legisla-
tion is coercive may be determined by the percentage of funding
that is tied to compliance with the legislation, and the suggestion of
an unspecified percentage is not inherently coercive. 255
The Congressional Research Service, an apolitical research
agency within the Library of Congress, recommends that § 5 of the
249. KENNETH R. THOmAs, SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND HOUSE RuLE XII,
Clause 7(c) 1 (2011), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41548-20110118.pdf.
250. Rep. Louise M. Slaughter, U.S. HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON RULES
MAJoRrrY OFFICE, http://democrats.rues.house.gov/archives/req-comm-rpts.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 21, 2012) (discussing constitutional authority statement requirement in Rule XIII,
Clause 3(d)(1)).
251. See Marc Spindelman, House Rule XII: Congress and the Constitution, 72 OHIO ST. L.J.
1317, 1317 (2011) (quoting House Rule XI1, Clause 7(c)(1)); New Constitutional Authority for
Introduced Legislation, HousE OF REPRESENTATIWES COMMITTEE ON RULES (Jan. 5, 2011), http://
rules.house.gov/about/PolicyDetail.aspx?NewsD=72.
252. See Regina R. Umpstead, The No Child Left Behind Act: Is It an Unfunded Mandate or a
Promotion of Federal Education Ideals , 37 J.L. & EDUC. 193, 196 (2008).
253. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936).
254. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-11 (1987).
255. See id. at 211-12.
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Fourteenth Amendment (§ 5) be the constitutional authority for
civil rights or equal protection enforcement legislation. 2 6 The Civil
Rights Acts of 1957,257 1960,258 and 1964259 did not include citations
to constitutional authority in the text of the bills. The laws' corre-
sponding reports, however, did include citations to § 5 for their
constitutional authority.26 0 The legislation proposed in this Note
should also specify that another source of authority for the LGBT
bullying legislation is § 5.
The Commerce Clause is another source of congressional au-
thority for a bullying notification law. The Commerce Clause pro-
vided the source of authority for Congress to create the
Department of Education. 261 Additionally, before Congress enacted
the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention
Act,26 2 the Department of Justice issued a memorandum citing the
Commerce Clause as the source of constitutional authority for that
hate crime prevention legislation. 263 If Congress used the Com-
merce Clause as a source of authority for notification legislation,
then the government would need to prove on a case-by-case basis
that the notification legislation has "an explicit and discrete con-
nection between the proscribed conduct and interstate or foreign
commerce." 264 The Commerce Clause may, however, be the least
compelling of the aforementioned sources of congressional
authority.
C. School District Liability Adds Value to Bullying Notification Laws
The lack of a uniform method for tracking discriminatory harass-
ment in U.S. schools could be resolved with a federal statute requir-
ing teachers and school administrators to report all known
256. See THOMAS, supra note 249, at 8.
257. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634.
258. Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 89.
259. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
260. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1205-2, at 2, 14 (1960); H.R. REP. No. 291, at 6 (1957).
261. See THOMAS, supra note 249, at 6.
262. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123
Stat. 2190.
263. MARTIN S. LEDERMAN, MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE ASSISTANT AT'oRNEY GENERAL
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, CONSTITUnONALITY OF THE MATTHEW SHEPARD HATE CRIMES
PREVENTION ACT 5 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2009/shepard-hate-crimes
.pdf.
264. Id.; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (stating that, while the
case at hand had too attenuated a connection to interstate commerce, case-by-case inquiries
may still be appropriate to determine whether a prohibited activity significantly affects inter-
state commerce).
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instances of bullying to municipal boards of education. These noti-
fications, discussed in greater detail below, should also be made
public in a manner that would allow government officials and con-
cerned citizens to track and monitor instances of LGBT bullying
and compare them to other forms of bullying. Public notification
should not, however, include the names of student victims, to avoid
additional harm to the victims that could result from public disclo-
sure of their harassment.
265
Enacting a law that requires teachers and school administrators
to report bullying would compel school districts to become aware of
bullying incidents. This would allow students to claim that sustained
inaction on the part of a town is indicative of a policy or custom
that allows harassment of LGBT students. Additionally, if the law
requires that notifications be made public, then students with such
claims would have their claims buttressed by the reported informa-
tion from other instances where the town or school board ignored
the bullying of its LGBT students. Students would thereby have ad-
ditional information to pressure the municipality to protect its stu-
dents and to prove whether a policy or custom of discrimination
exists.
266
Potential critics of this Note's proposal might argue that the leg-
islation creates an affirmative duty for school districts to protect stu-
dents from peer-to-peer harassment based on LGBT status,
although they have no affirmative duty to protect students from
harassment.267 This legislation could, the argument goes, lead
school boards to conclude that they are compelled to expend dis-
proportionate time and resources to protect LGBT students and
avoid lawsuits alleging discrimination.2 68 Additionally, this imposed
obligation could be criticized as either inappropriate for federal
legislation; 269 an inappropriate policy decision, given the ubiquity
265. See GUiDANCE ON NOTIFYING PARENTS WHEN A STUDENT HAS BEEN BULLIED BASED ON
SEXUAL ORIENTATION OR GENDER IDENTIT'/'ExPRESSION: IMPLFMENTATION OF 603 CMR 49.05,
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 2 (2011), available at
http://www.gbpflag.org/uploads/guidance.pdf.
266. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 553, 554 (7th Cir. 1996).
267. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 189-90 (1989).
268. See Patricia Alex, Bullying Law Tough on School Districts, THE RECORD (Oct. 9, 2011,
6:52 PM), http://www.northjersey.con/news/131437448Bullying-law~tough-on school-
districts.html; Anna Spiewak, Ridgewood School District Says New Bullying Law is a Drain on Re-
sources, THE RIDGEWOOD NEWS (Dec. 19, 2011, 11:01 AM), http://wwV.northjersey.com/news
/ 135859258_Ridgewood school-districtsays-new.bullyinglawis-a drainon-resources_.
html.
269. Sarah Hulsenga, Michele Bachmann Says Anti-Gay Bullying "not a federal issue," CBS
NEWS (Sept. 16, 2011, 7:11 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544162-20107604-
503544.html.
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of peer-to-peer bullying;2 70 or a potential financial burden on
schools with limited budgets if they must pay damages for not com-
plying with the law.271
Such criticisms are, in part, rooted in an assumption that the
Constitution is one of negative rights-that the government's obli-
gation is to avoid depriving citizens of their inherent rights.2 7 2 How-
ever, the United States Constitution contains many affirmative
obligations.273 Affirmative obligations, such as the right to counsel,
can have practical financial costs, but such costs should not be dis-
positive of whether the government should facilitate those rights.274
Likewise, if LGBT students are deliberately deprived of the same
level of protection as their non-LGBT peers, their right to equal
protection has been violated and Congress should provide a rem-
edy for those constitutional violations.
D. Suggested Provisions for Notification Law
The proposed legislative reform has five elements. First, the legis-
lation would require school districts or municipalities to publicly
designate an employee of the town council or school board as the
authority to whom notifications of peer-to-peer bullying should be
sent. Second, the statute would require all teachers and school ad-
ministrators to report any instance of school bullying of which they
are aware. Third, the designated employees would be required to
inform all members of the town council or school board about the
occurrences of bullying that the employee receives within a reason-
able amount of time to help the bullying victim.2 7 5 Fourth, the noti-
fication law would require that teachers and school administrators
270. Lee Fang, California Christian Coalition Explains Repeal Effort Against Gay Education
Law: Bullying is Normal THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 19, 2011, 2:06 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/
lgbt/2011/09/19/322730/ca-christian-coalition-bullying/?mobile=NC.
271. Kelly Thompson Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing: Defining the Constitu-
tional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 399, 469 (2000).
272. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MicH. L. Rav. 2271, 2272
(1990); see also Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 491 (1989).
273. Bandes, supra note 272, at 2312 n.212 ("See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 ("House of
Representatives shall be composed of"); art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 (privilege of writ of habeas corpus); art.
I § 9, cl. 7 (regular statement and account of receipts and expenditures shall be published;
art. 1, cl. 8 (President will preserve, protect and defend the Constitution); amend. IV (war-
rant and probable cause requirements); amend. V (grand jury requirement); amend. VI
(right to speedy, public jury trial; confrontation, compulsory process, counsel); amend. VII
(right to civil jury trial)").
274. Cf Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
275. It is beyond the scope of this Note to determine what amount of time is "reasona-
ble." However, a time period would be per se unreasonable if a pattern of LGBT bullying
occurred and the official was not made aware early enough to notice the pattern.
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also notify school districts of other bullied students' demographic
information, both to protect all students and to provide a basis of
comparison for an equal protection cause of action. Finally, the des-
ignated employees would be required to publish reports from stu-
dents, teachers, or school officials about the occurrences of all
bullying.
The first requirement-that school districts or town councils des-
ignate and publicize one of its own employees as the person to re-
ceive notifications-would create two positive results. First,
accountability would derive from a member of government being
held responsible for the implementation of legislation. Second,
teachers, school administrators, and members of the community
would know whom they should send their complaints to. For this
legislation to be effective, however, the designated employee
should be a school district employee, to help attach liability to
school districts.
The second requirement-that all teachers and public adminis-
trators must report bullying-is beneficial for both teachers and
students. The teachers benefit because they are less likely to be ac-
cused of being a whistleblower or being pro-LGBT in a community
that is anti-LGBT. The legal obligation to report LGBT bullying
would provide "cover" to those who might not otherwise want to
report an incident of LGBT bullying to the school district. Students
would also benefit because they would be able to find out, through
public information, whether teachers are reporting the discrimina-
tion that they witness. If teachers do not report instances of bully-
ing, the absence of notifications in the district records would be
evidence of a teacher's noncompliance with the law, and students
or advocates could inform school supervisors that the teacher is not
fulfilling all job requirements.
The third requirement-that the designated employee report
notifications to the school board-is essential to the establishment
of municipal liability because it ensures that board members are
aware of the existence, and any potential pattern, of LGBT bullying
in their schools. One benefit of this requirement is that board
members who want to protect LGBT students would know where to
direct their efforts. Additionally, for purposes of establishing mu-
nicipal liability, school boards would be unable to deny that they
had a policy of tolerating LGBT bullying but were merely unaware
of the problem, since the board members would receive regular up-
dates. The appropriate time period to respond may depend on how
many LGBT bullying incidents transpire within a school district and
the amount of time that passed between such occurrences. This
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Note proposes that reports should be made four times per year. As
discussed above, courts have generally found that the right to equal
protection is violated after approximately two years of continuous
harassment. Therefore, in order for school district officials to be
made aware of the problem early enough to prevent a civil rights
violation, they should be notified in terms of quarterly, not annual,
reports.
The fourth requirement is that teachers and school administra-
tors notify the school district of other bullied students' demo-
graphic information and of the the schools' responses to non-LGBT
harassment. This requirement would help protect a variety of stu-
dents from unequal treatment because some schools may have non-
LGBT bullying issues based on other demographic biases. This noti-
fication requirement can provide a basis of comparison for a wide
range of students' concerns about equal protection violations. A
student who claims deliberate indifference to LGBT harassment
through a comparison with the treatment of other bullied students
would need evidence of the school district's responses to non-LGBT
bullying. 276 This fourth requirement would provide such data.
The final requirement-that general information about the noti-
fications be made public-is essential to establishing a policy or cus-
tom of discrimination. 277 A student may be the victim of a few
incidents of LGBT bullying and not be aware that other students
have also been the victims of the same type of bullying. The student
or parent may be unaware of a pattern of ignored incidents. In-
creased knowledge about a pattern of discriminatory conduct may
encourage victims and their families to report the harassment to
the designated school district official. Publicly available information
could also convince a judge that a policy or custom of discrimina-
tion exists, given that the court could be presented with a history of
disregard for a class of students' welfare. Moreover, the public na-
ture of the notifications could prompt a school board to mitigate
LGBT bullying to avoid the appearance of a custom of
discrimination.
276. See Brown v. Ogletree, No. 11-CV-1491, 2012 WL 591190, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21,
2012).
277. The information could be made public in a variety of ways, for example, through a
school's website or newsletter.
[VOL. 46:1
Put the Town on Notice
E. Federalism Concerns
The proposed congressional extensions of municipal liability
raise federalism concerns.27 Although federalism embraces the
tenet that the federal government should respect state govern-
ments' authority, federalism nonetheless adheres to the well-estab-
lished principle that states must honor the Constitution's guarantee
of equal protection.2 79 Monell liability is one product of the federal-
ist concern for balancing municipal liability for constitutional viola-
tions with the concomitant need to respect the states. 2 0 The
Eleventh Amendment 281 was enacted to overcome a Supreme Court
opinion2 12 that held that states are subject to suit by their citizens.2
83
If the extension of municipal liability allows for a more attenuated
level of causation between an employee's actions and municipal lia-
bility, the law runs the risk that "municipal liability collaps[es] into
respondeat superior liability.,"2 4 Respondeat superior liability is not ap-
propriate for municipal liability because the purpose of municipal
liability is that the government be accountable for its own conduct,
policies, or customs-not those of its employees.
28 5
Federalism concerns protect state governments from liability in
cases that affect the fiscal health of state treasuries.286 The Supreme
Court's sanctioning of municipal liability for constitutional torts,
however, puts school districts' and municipalities' fiscal health at a
greater risk because municipal treasuries are smaller than state trea-
suries. Municipal fiscal health may therefore be harmed by exten-
sions of municipal liability.28 7 However, juries' previous damages
awards of $27,000-$300,000 in this type of litigation should not be a
prohibitive cost for protecting students. 288
278. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997).
279. See Mark R. Brown, De-Federalizing Common Law Torts: Empathy for Parratt, Hudson and
Daniels, 28 B.C. L. REV. 813, 814 (1987); Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School
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Critics of this Note's proposed legislation could also argue that
any legislation establishing municipal liability for LGBT bullying is
tantamount to the creation of a federal tort for school board deci-
sions. 289 Such a concern is misplaced because the liability that re-
sults from this law has already been established under Monell and its
progeny. The proposed reform merely ensures that school districts
are made aware of the problems in their schools, removing the re-
porting onus from students and putting it on teachers and adminis-
trators. It does not alter the standard of conduct for school officials
or heighten the legal requirements for their actions.
These federalism concerns also do not recognize that Congress
knowingly impacted the balance between the federal and state gov-
ernments by allowing certain state actors to be subject to suit under
§ 1983.290 Congress adopted § 1983 to compel states to respect their
citizens' right to equal protection at a time when states were not
enforcing basic civil liberties.2 91 Moreover, this Note's proposed leg-
islation does not advocate for an extension of municipal liability
but instead facilitates the enforcement of an existing right.
CONCLUSION
The Equal Protection Clause and § 1983 provide the federal gov-
ernment with the tools necessary to require that states treat their
citizens equally. The contemporary problem of LGBT student bully-
ing demonstrates that these students do not receive equal protec-
tion under the law. The Supreme Court's establishment of Monell
liability provides these students with the legal foundation to enforce
their right to equal protection, but students frequently cannot
prove that there is a custom of discrimination because they lack
evidence that school district administrators were aware of, and de-
liberately indifferent to, the students' discriminatory bullying. A
federal notification law would solve both problems: school district
authorities would become aware of, and be able to prevent, LGBT
students' unequal treatment, and students who are forced to en-
force their rights through litigation would have evidence to rebut
the school districts' defense that they were not aware that LGBT
students were treated differently.
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We live in a time when students bully LGBT youth at school, chil-
dren cause other children to contemplate suicide, and many school
officials turn a blind eye to these problems. This Note's proposed
notification law will provide information to students so they know
they are not alone, to school administrators as an instruction that
preventative measures should be taken, and to parents and attor-
neys seeking evidence for litigation if unequal treatment persists.
Congress should put the towns on notice: help LGBT bullying vic-
tims or pay the price for deliberate indifference.
